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WTO:
Progress in the harmonization of 
the international trading system has 
stalled since the Doha Round nego-
tiations, launched in 2001, failed to 
produce any meaningful reforms of 
the WTO and its sister institutions. 
 This is despite an under-
whelming agreement reached in 
Bali last December that achieved 
the goal of trade facilitation 
amongst WTO nations by stream-
lining customs practices and reduc-
ing quotas on agricultural goods 
exported from developing countries 
to developed countries. If prop-
erly implemented, this agreement 
will certainly help increase global 
economic activity, but in reality 
it consists of only a small frac-
tion of the reforms initially envi-
sioned by policy makers at Doha. 
 At more than 12 years old, 
many observers are starting to lose 
hope the Doha Round will ever con-
clude, as policy makers are far apart 
on issues relating to agricultural 
subsidies and special treatment for 
developing countries. To them the 
agreement in Bali, while helpful, 
will do little to assure a success-
ful conclusion of the Doha Round. 
Likewise, international businesses 
and analysts believe this failure has 
hurt the creditability of the WTO 
as an engine of economic growth. 
 Supporters of liberal trade 
and increased international reg-
ulatory synchronization should 
not fear, however, for there lie 
many paths to the laudable goal 
of international economic liber-
alization. Currently two massive 
trade deals are being negotiated 
that will have colossal implications 
for the future of the international 
trading system. The first is the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
a so-called NAFTA on steroids, 
which will include 12 to 14 coun-
tries bordering the Pacific Ocean. 
The second deal, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) between the United States 
and Europe, will be the largest Free 
Trade Agreement, in terms of total 
GDP represented, ever negoti-
ated. Together the TPP and TTIP 
are expected to increase members’ 
GDP by at least $512 billion by 
2025 ($223 billion for the TPP 
and $289 billion for the TTIP). 
 In order to maintain the 
post-World War II drive for inter-
national free trade and increase 
global prosperity, policy makers 
and academics should shift focus 
from the WTO to regional agree-
ments like these as vehicles for 
international trade liberalization. 
In addition to being easier to nego-
tiate, these agreements allow skep-
tical states to opt out and pursue 
the international trading strate-
gies they believe to be best. Indeed 
some scholars believe countries 
with different levels of income 
would benefit from trade strat-
egies in line with their level of 
development.  However, within 
the WTO, all countries follow the 
same rules or else accrue unman-
ageable penalties. The proliferation 
of these large regional trade agree-
ments will permit nonparticipat-
ing countries to either create their 
own rival agreement or conform 
to the rules of the TPP and TTIP. 
 Nonparticipating coun-
tries will likely be attracted to these 
new agreements and will imple-
ment the necessary policy adjust-
ments in order to share the effi-
ciency gains that come from inter-
national competition and regu-
latory synchronization, such as 
cheaper goods and services that 
will in effect increase the disposable 
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income of all citizens. One by 
one signatories to the TPP and 
TTIP will increase and there will 
be pressure to integrate the two 
agreements, creating a trade bloc 
that spans both the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans that will not rival 
the WTO but that will replace it. 
 The United States, at the 
center of both agreements, fully 
understands the future implica-
tions of successfully concluding 
the trade deals. It has therefore 
attempted to include provisions, 
particularly in the TPP, that aim to 
indirectly address the statist eco-
nomic policies of its largest rival, 
China, who is not included in 
the agreement and therefore has 
little say in the outcome. The first 
provision would aim to limit the 
number and extent of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which are 
abundant in the Chinese economy. 
This effort to limit SOEs has run 
into opposition because a few 
of the potential TPP members, 
including Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Singapore, have significant 
number of SOEs. Additionally, 
many view the US’s stance as 
hypocritical considering the US 
government’s strong presence in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
  The second provision the 
US is trying to implement is a 
penalty against currency manip-
ulation. This attempt by the US is 
more obviously directed towards 
China, as none of the TPP members 
are suspected of strongly manipu-
lating the value of their currency. 
Once again, however, this stance 
by the US is viewed as hypocritical 
and unfair, especially because the 
definition of currency manipula-
tion provided by the US involves 
the accumulation of foreign cur-
rency reserves, which the United 
States, as the issuer of the inter-
national reserve currency, does 
not hold in significant quantities. 
Additionally, it may be difficult 
for the US to add such a provision 
because of the difficulty of mon-
itoring currency manipulation. 
Even among economists, defini-
tions of currency manipulation 
are somewhat ambiguous, and 
there are no agreed upon metrics 
for determining whether or not 
a country is artificially main-
taining the value of its currency. 
     With regards to the TTIP, the 
enthusiasm that excited busi-
ness leaders following President 
Obama’s 2013 State of the Union, 
in which the deal was announced, 
has dissipated as negotiations have 
stalled. Of the more pressing issues 
is the treatment of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) in 
European markets. Europeans are 
fearful that the conclusion of the 
TTIP will lead to the saturation 
of their supermarkets with cheap 
unlabeled American GMO prod-
ucts, which they believe would 
be against the wishes of their 
citizens and harmful to public 
health. Indeed, many Americans 
support the notion of manda-
tory labeling for GMO products. 
However, there is broad scientific 
agreement that GMO foods are 
no more dangerous than conven-
tional foods and have no adverse 
health effects in humans.  Thus it 
would be mistake to require such 
labels on agricultural products. 
 Rent seeking agricul-
tural lobbies in Europe, which 
have tremendous power in some 
countries, also fear that the satu-
ration of European markets with 
American GMOs will damage 
their livelihoods, which come from 
non-GMO products. This line of 
thinking is false and damaging to 
the economic future of Europe. In 
fact, competition from US agricul-
tural goods should make EU firms 
respond in two ways. First, they 
will be incentivized to label their 
products as “organic” or “made 
without GMOs” and target the 
large market (of which the author 
is a part) for such goods on both 
continents. Surely this response 
would be better than requiring 
mandatory labels for GMOs, as 
it would increase emphasis on 
the liberal aspects of the deal by 
incentivizing companies to make 
changes rather than emplac-
ing burdensome regulations 
on them. Secondly, European 
farmers can begin to experi-
ment and create GMOs that cater 
to the EU market, of which they 
should be experts. Both of these 
options will increase the freedom 
of choice and thus the well-be-
ing of both US and EU citizens. 
 Even if agreements on 
certain issues cannot be reached 
soon, negotiators need not let that 
inhibit progress towards an even-
tual deal. Trade deals should not 
be negotiated on an all or nothing 
basis. Instead, negotiators should 
first lock-in what can easily be 
agreed upon and create a time-
table to deal with other, thorn-
ier issues in the future. This will 
help create momentum which 
may ease tension during debates 
on the more contentious issues. It 
will also quicken the delivery of 
economic benefits to businesses 
that are looking for opportunities 
to invest and expand, particularly 
in an era when good investments 
are otherwise becoming scarcer.
 To help achieve support for 
economic integration in the United 
States, President Obama needs to 
explain to US citizens that cheaper 
imports will increase the dispos-
able income of all Americans 
and create jobs as American 
firms will have greater possibili-
ties to expand to foreign markets. 
Furthermore, the President needs 
to do a better job of convincing 
high-ranking members of his own 
party that increased international 
trade will help promote domestic 
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prosperity and international 
peace. Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid and House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi opposed 
potential legislation that would 
grant President Obama Trade 
Promotional Authority (TPA), 
on the grounds that it would hurt 
established domestic industries 
that would be unable to compete 
on the international market. With 
the passage of such authority, the 
President can avoid attaching 
additional congressional amend-
ments to trade deals and submit 
the deals directly to congress for a 
simple yes-or-no vote. Most ana-
lysts, though not all, agree grant-
ing the President TPA is essential 
to successfully concluding these 
trade deals.  Trade deals in the 
past have mostly been approved 
with the president holding TPA. 
 Even without TPA, opti-
mistic forecasts have the conclu-
sion of the TPP arriving in late 
2014 and the TTIP sometime in 
2015.  While these forecasts are 
little more than guesses, they do 
highlight the fact that a post-WTO 
world may be fast approaching. If 
the US and the EU want to con-
tinue to direct the post war inter-
national trading system based on 
liberal principles, they should be 
motivated to conclude both agree-
ments quickly. After their com-
pletion the two economic super-
powers should look to harmonize 
the two agreements and create a 
free trade area that spans both 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 
Furthermore, the United States 
should look to strengthen NAFTA 
which is 20 years old this year and 
ready to be updated. The US and 
EU would also do well to include 
Canada and Mexico in the TTIP, 
as they are not currently part of 
the discussions. The future of 
international trade looks bright at 
this point early in the 21st century, 
which is good news for those of 
us looking to have a little extra 
pocket money to spend on the 
goods we buy everyday.
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